Treaty Vs An Executive Agreement

As printing resources have been migrated online, it is now possible to complete the first two or three steps of the contract search process using an online contract database, such as the HeinOnline Treaty and Accords Library, HeinOnline`s World Library Treaty or the U.N. Treaty Series Online. Other scholars have relied on historical perspectives to explain the implementation of the treaty. For example, Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison proposed that the choice of presidents between the two engagement mechanisms be influenced, at least in part, by the Senate`s continued and concerted insistence on maintaining an important role in the ratification process. Footnote 45 Such insistence, which mainly results in statements and correspondence, would create a “soft law” that would impose political constraints on the options available to the executive. At the same time, the Attention of the Senate is selective, with an emphasis on “big” agreements, for which public engagement and attention are exceptionally high. Therefore, the differences in the application of the treaty would be explained, at least in part, by the fact that some agreements, particularly important arms control agreements, are subject to Senate scrutiny, while others are less of a concern to the Senate. The authors support their hypothesis anecdotally and recall cases where presidents have given up on major arms control agreements, such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, under pressure from the Senate. 9 id. to 1312; See also Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System 76 (2015) (considering that one of the reasons for the popularity of executive agreements is that it is “much easier to conclude the growing number of international agreements without submitting them to two-thirds of the Senate for approval”). To answer this question, scientists have made several hypotheses about the current role of the treaty.

These can be broadly divided into two categories: first, there are assumptions that support the idea that treaties have no independent value as a political instrument. These reports generally explain the use of the contract by motivations that are orthogonal reflection on the quality of the promise itself. Second, there are hypotheses that suggest that the promises made as treaties differ qualitatively from those made as executive agreements and that the decision to use the treaty is determined by those considerations. Table 4 presents the results of Cox`s model. The model (1) contains only the contractual indicator. It can be seen as a simple descriptible comparison of the sustainability of contracts and all executive agreements, without taking into account other characteristics. The model (2) includes the chair and the theme of fixed effects.